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Popular Authority in Conciliar 
and Canonistic Thought: 
the Case of Elections
This paper assesses the place of laypeople in the thought of 15th-century 
conciliarists. The dangers associated with heresy inclined the conciliarists 
towards a restrictive view of lay participation in doctrinal debates and 
ecclesiastical government. Yet, in legal commentaries regarding canonical 
elections, conciliarists like Francesco Zabarella and Niccolò Tudeschi 
admitted that popular participation in canonical elections was to be 
tolerated under certain conditions. This paper argues that the intellectual 
method of the canonists as well as certain practical considerations account 
for their open-mindedness about lay participation in canonical elections.
Autorité populaire dans la pensée conciliaire et canonistique : 
le cas des élections
Cet article évalue la place des laïcs dans la pensée des conciliaristes du 
XVe siècle. Dans un premier temps, les dangers associés à l’hérésie ont mené 
les conciliaristes à adopter une conception restrictive de la participation 
laïque dans les débats doctrinaux et le gouvernement ecclésiastique. Or, 
les commentaires juridiques des canonistes comme Francesco Zabarella 
et Niccolò Tudeschi montrent que la participation populaire aux élections 
canoniques pouvait être tolérée sous certaines conditions. Selon cette 
étude, la méthode intellectuelle des canonistes, ainsi que certaines 
considérations pratiques, peuvent expliquer leur ouverture d’esprit vis-à-
vis de la participation laïque dans les élections canoniques.
The general councils of the i fteenth century were situated on 
the threshold of a period of revolutionary change for the Church. 
The relationship between the people and the priesthood would be 
dramatically renegotiated in the course of the next two centuries. 
Secular parties would claim the right to superintend the clergy’s 
duties and to regulate moral discipline within the Church. This was 
often accomplished against a background of violent agitation, or 
the threat of this. The leaders of the Church in the i fteenth century 
were themselves witness to a militant outburst of reforming energy 
in Bohemia, which sought to allow the community, among other 
things, the right to enjoy the Eucharist on equal terms with priests, to 
preach and to enforce Christian justice1. Against this background, 
the reforming work of the i fteenth-century councils may appear 
very feeble. The council fathers stand open to the charge that they 
made no attempt to harness the popular energy of the period to 
strengthen the Church. Even the conciliar theorists, who seemed 
to lay such weight upon the power of the Church as a community, 
were, in the eyes of one modern historian, fatally compromised by 
their nakedly hierocratic aims. The general councils were dominated 
by the higher clergy. As far as Walter Ullmann was concerned, “the 
lower clergy and educated laymen were, so to speak, knocking at 
the gate, and were refused entry.”2
Ullmann’s claims have attracted comment from historians before. 
Francis Oakley has pointed out that Ullmann neglected those 
aspects of conciliarism which made provision for lay attendance.3 
Johannes Helmrath also found Ullmann’s claims questionable 
(albeit thought-provoking).4 Studies by Jürgen Miethke, Werner 
Krämer, Thomas Prügl and others, have given greater nuance to our 
1. There were, of course, signii cant divisions of opinion within the Hussite 
movement about how far such reforms should go, and the agency through which 
they would be accomplished. Frantisek Šmahel, La Révolution Hussite : une 
anomalie historique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1985, p. 74-83.
2. Walter Ullmann, A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965, p. 224.
3. Francis Oakley, “Figgis, Constance, and the Divines of Paris”, American 
Historical Review, 75 (1969), p. 377-380.
4. Joseph Helmrath, Das Basler Konzil, 1431-1449: Forschungsstand und 
Probleme, Cologne, Böhlau, 1987, p. 92 and note 69 on the same page.
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understanding of conciliarist theories, and the place of laypeople 
within them5. This paper owes a huge debt to all these works. It 
wishes, however, to situate the thought of the council fathers in a 
context which may help to uncover the origins of their ambivalent 
attitudes towards laypeople. The clericalism of the councils 
has usually been analysed within the intellectual framework of 
conciliarism. But the conciliarist texts generally devoted little space 
to the status of ordinary lay people within the congregatio i delium 
and laypeople occupied a marginal position in the reform agendas 
of the councils. I wish to account for this omission. I will take the 
works of ecclesiology as a staring point, but will attempt to view 
the council’s aims in broader political and social perspective. It 
will be argued here that the battle against  heresy had a decisive 
impact upon the councils’ attitudes towards ordinary laypeople. 
In the debates with the Hussites, the council fathers’ reservations 
about popular inl uence in the Church are most clearly exposed. 
Yet, if fear was the most salient motif in the council’s dealing with 
the Hussites, there was also an awareness of the Church’s reliance 
upon lay cooperation in daily administration. The uneasy balance 
between a regressive conservatism and a desire to stabilise lay-
clerical relationships informs conciliar statements about popular 
participation.
The attitudes of the conciliar delegates towards the people were 
shaped by their practical experiences of Church government. The 
council fathers were not, of course, full-time polemicists. Many 
were benei ced, and so had some experience of quotidian Church 
government, even if, in many cases, their administrative duties 
were discharged vicariously.6 Many were trained in canon law. 
Their knowledge of the law, as an academic discipline and as a 
5. Jürgen Miethke, “Die Konzilien als Forum der öffentlichen Meinung 
im 15. Jahrhundert”, Deutsches Archiv für Enforschung des Mittelalters, 37 
(1981), p. 740-741. Also see J. Miethke’s forthcoming article, “Konziliarismus”, 
Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. Albrecht  Cordes 
and Heiner  Lück, Berlin, E.  Schmidt, 2004-. Werner Krämer, Konsens und 
Rezeption: Verfassungsprinzipien der Kirche im Basler Konziliarismus, Münster, 
Aschendorff, 1980; Thomas Prügl, Die Ekklesiologie Heinrich Kalteisens OP in 
der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Basler Konziliarismus, Paderborn, F. Schönigh, 
1995.
6. On the difi culties of estimating the numbers and the careers of those 
present at the councils, see J.  Miethke, “Konzilien als Forum der öffentlichen 
Meinung,” p. 743-751; J. Helmrath, Basler Konzil, p. 71-83.
316 ALEXANDER RUSSELL
set of practical guidelines, informed their attitudes towards power 
relations within the Church. Brian Tierney’s formative work has 
shown that the laws regulating ecclesiastical corporations were 
fundamental to the development of conciliarism.7 This paper will 
excavate the substrata of assumptions which informed conciliarist 
views about lay participation in the Church. It will analyse the work 
of two prominent canonists at the councils: Francesco Zabarella and 
Niccolò Tudeschi (Panormitanus). Moving beyond their well-known 
statements concerning lay inl uence in the general councils, the 
paper will consider their treatment of popular participation in other 
ecclesiastical institutions and procedures. In order to narrow down 
this vast i eld the paper will focus on elections within the Church. 
As we will see, the same concepts informed the legal arrangements 
for episcopal elections as structured thinking about lay participation 
in conciliar decision-making. In conclusion, the paper will compare 
the theoretical prescriptions concerning popular inl uence in 
elections with the procedural realities in Western Europe. Although 
there was an increasing tendency in the later middle ages to reduce 
popular participation in ecclesiastical elections, there are several 
cases where it was countenanced. The problems involved in these 
negotiations reveal the ambiguities which would be seized upon in 
the Reformation era.
THE CONCILIAR ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HERETICS
Let us begin with the political and social context in which 
conciliar views towards popular participation in the Church were 
shaped. After the schism had been mended at Constance, the 
refutation of the Hussites was the most pressing item on the higher 
clergy’s agenda. It initially gave the Council of Basel its raison 
d’être and its inl uence upon the representatives of the councils 
cannot be overstated. Yet it is strange that studies of the encounters 
with the Bohemians at Constance and Basel tend to isolate these 
experiences from the rest of the councils’ activities. They have 
been treated (not without justice) as a botched job, which detracted 
7. Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1955.
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from the otherwise laudable reforming aims of the delegates. The 
engagement (or lack of engagement) with the Hussites at Constance 
and Basel has been thoroughly examined, yet arguably the extent 
of its impact upon the conciliar representatives has not been fully 
appreciated.8
The Hussite Revolution was an alarming prospect for prelates 
across Europe. It presented a clear challenge to the clerical 
monopoly of power within the Church. As such, it cast a shadow 
far beyond the territories immediately disturbed by the turmoil. 
England was, of course, intensely concerned by developments in 
Bohemia as it was accused of being the original breeding-ground 
of the Hussite heresy.9 The territories of the Holy Roman Empire 
were anxious about the commotions occurring on their doorstep. 
The University of Cologne felt impelled, for example, to take a 
leading role in the extirpation of heresy during this period, and sent 
the theologian Heymeric de Campo, among others, in a delegation 
to Basel, to aid it in its refutation of the Hussites.10 But French 
clerics, far beyond the immediate zone of conl ict, were also 
alarmed. Their feelings of panic emerge in a clerical assembly held 
at Bourges in 1432, presided over by the Archbishop of Rouen, 
Amédée de Talaru.11 The assembly beseeched the French king to 
send delegates to the Council of Basel, even though the council 
had refused to obey Pope Eugenius’s bull of dissolution. As well 
as being i tting, French attendance at Basel was necessary, owing 
8. On the Bohemians’ experience at Basel, see Frantisek Šmahel, Die 
Hussitische Revolution, vol. 3, ed. Alexander Patschovsky, Hannover, Hahnsche 
Buchhandlung, 2002, p.  1560-1591. For older, though still useful, studies, see: 
Ernest F. Jacob, “The Bohemians at the Council of Basel, 1433”, Prague Essays, 
ed. Robert W. Seton-Watson, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 81-123. Paul de 
Vooght, “La confrontation des thèses hussites et romaines au concile de Bâle”, 
Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 37 (1970), p. 97-137; p. 254-291.
9. Michael  van Dussen, “Bohemia in English Religious Controversy before 
the Henrician Reformation”, The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice, 
vol.  7, ed.  Zdeněk  V.  David and David  R.  Holeton, Prague, Academy of the 
Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2009, p. 42-60.
10. Maarten J.  F.  M. Hoenen, “Academics and Intellectual Life in the 
Low Countries: The University Career of Heymeric de Campo”, Recherches de 
théologie ancienne et médiévale, 61 (1994), p. 188-190; p. 197-202.
11. Histoire de l’Église depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours, vol.  14: 
L’Église au temps du Grand Schisme et de la Crise Conciliare, 1378-1449, ed. 
Étienne Delaruelle, Edmond-René Labande and Paul Ourliac, Paris, Bloud & Gay, 
1962-1964, p. 234-235.
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to the danger of the Hussite rebels, whose leaders had spread their 
ideas among the Dauphiné, and incited popular riots in Forez and 
Mâcon. Ordinary people in these areas had been led to believe that 
their prelates were not their pastors, but were acting merely for 
i nancial gain.12 According to the assembly, the rebels in Forez and 
Mâcon held the conviction that worldly dominium (whether secular 
or ecclesiastical) was held only by those in grace, and that those who 
were in a state of mortal sin could not rule over their inferiors. Lords 
were to work the land as labourers, earning their bread through the 
sweat of their brow, and no taxes were owed to them. The rebels 
were also said to have declared that two priests were enough for 
their needs.13 These sentiments bear striking resemblance not only 
to the utterances of some of the Taborites but also to ideas espoused 
in the 1381 peasant uprising in England.14 Of course, it is entirely 
possible that the clergy were projecting their own fears onto the 
uprising. But even if the links between France and Bohemia were 
more imaginary than real, the assembly’s testimony points to the 
grave concerns which heresy had aroused across Europe.
The debates over the Four Hussite Articles at the Council of 
Basel most clearly exposed the conciliar antipathy towards popular 
participation in ecclesiastical government. This reactionary trend is 
illustrated in the confrontation between Mikuláš of Pelhřimov and 
Gilles Charlier over the Hussite article which defended the right of 
the community to correct sins.15 Mikuláš of Pelhřimov was initially 
careful to distinguish between the various forms of correction—
12. Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium Seculi Decimi Quinti, vol.  2, 
Vienna, 1857-1935, p.  138: “mentes simplicium putarent ecclesie prelatos non 
pastorum, sed personas gerere mercanariorum”.
13. Monumenta Conciliorum, vol. 2, p.  138: “ausique fuerunt dicere, quod 
in tota patria sufi cerent duo sacerdotes, et quod omnes nobiles tenebantur ad 
labores manuum suarum ex divina sententia… ex hoc inferentes tributa dominis 
temporalibus solvi non debere”. This error was said by the clerics to be “errori 
Bohemorum coniunctus”.
14. Margaret  Aston, “Lollardy and sedition, 1381-1431”, Past and Present, 
17 (1960), p. 1-44; M. Aston, “Corpus Christi and Corpus Regni: Heresy and the 
Peasants’ Revolt”, Past and Present, 143 (1994), p. 3-47. Rosamond Faith, “The 
“Great Rumour” of 1377 and Peasant Ideology”, The English Rising of 1381, 
ed.  Rodney  H.  Hilton and Trevor  H.  Aston, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1984, p. 43-73.
15. Thomas  A. Fudge, “Crime, Punishment and Pacii sm in the Thought of 
Bishop Mikuláš of Pelhřimov, 1420-1452”, The Bohemian Reformation and 
Religious Practice, ed. Zdeněk V. David and David R. Holeton, p. 69-103.
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ranging from physical coercion to fraternal correction—and the 
social orders to which these pertained. In general, the power of 
physical coercion belonged to secular princes, and the power of 
spiritual correction belonged to priests. Once this had been pointed 
out, he asserted that all members of the community, secular as well 
as spiritual, and of every rank, were obliged to correct those sinning 
against the law of God. Pelhřimov was insistent that lay subjects 
could correct their clerical superiors in a spirit of charity, and to 
oppose their crimes publicly.16 Some of his arguments were drawn 
from orthodox teachings on fraternal correction, but in adjudging 
laypeople competent to decide whether priests had failed in their 
duties, he was in danger of infringing the teaching about the two 
swords, and the immunity of clerics from secular justice.17 Even 
more inl ammatory was his assertion that peasants (rustici) could 
preach and write against the wickedness of priests, and his reminder 
that in the Old Testament they had even righteously slain priests.18 
Even though he did not call for a rejection of the priesthood as a 
separate estate, Pelhřimov evidently wished to bring it within the 
ambit of communal justice, thus signii cantly reconi guring lay-
clerical relations.
In his rejection of Pelhřimov’s arguments, the Council of Basel’s 
spokesman, Gilles Charlier, emphasised the jurisdictional and moral 
superiority of the clergy. He argued this superiority meant that they 
could not be publicly admonished by their subjects for their sins or 
even for their faith, as such an action would lead to the retraction 
of the obedience owed to them.19 If correction were to occur, it 
16. Orationes quibus Nicolaus de Pelhřimov, Taboritarum Episcopus, et 
Ulricus de Znojmo, orphanorum sacerdos, articulos de peccatis publicis puniendis 
et libertate verbi dei in concilio Basiliensi anno 1433 ineunte defenderunt, ed. 
F. M. Bartoš, Tabor, 1935, p. 14.
17. Orationes quibus Nicolaus de Pelhřimov, p.  15: “Item secundum leges 
ecclesie laycus debet accusare in casu clericum deliquentem et per consequens 
iudicare quod sit malus”. For a study of the theory and practice of fraternal 
correction in late medieval England, see Edwin D. Craun, Ethics and power in 
medieval English reformist writing, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010.
18. Orationes quibus Nicolaus de Pelhřimov, p.  27: “Item prophete sancti, 
sacerdotes et rustici predicarunt et scripserunt contra cleri maliciam, ymo et clerum 
sub lege veteri meritorie occiderunt, ut patet de Helia propheta et Daniele et ceteris 
qui presbiteros occiderunt”.
19. Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio…, vol.  29, 
ed. Gian D. Mansi, Venice, 1784-1785, p. 901.
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had to take place privately and with due reverence. Pelhřimov’s 
advocacy of legal rigor in response to public sinfulness provokes 
telling comments from Charlier on the subject of the moral 
distinctions between the laity and clergy. In particular, he argued 
that prostitution should be tolerated by the Church authorities. 
This in itself was not particularly unusual: following Augustine 
and Thomas Aquinas, most authorities regarded prostitution as a 
necessary evil, which curbed sexual appetites and prevented them 
from overwhelming the social order.20 The traditional stress was on 
the pragmatic character of legal prohibitions. Charlier’s use of the 
sources is noteworthy, however, for underscoring the moral gulf 
between the laity and the priesthood. He cited Aquinas to argue 
that the law could seek to prohibit only what could possibly be 
enforced.21 Seeing as most Christians fell considerably short of 
moral perfection, it was not feasible for the law to prescribe perfect 
sexual conduct. Charlier concluded that prostitution saved the 
polity from being disturbed, for it was not easy for the multitude to 
abstain from the pleasures and lusts to which they were addicted.22 
The implication was that ordinary laypeople could not aspire 
to the same state of moral perfection as the priesthood, and this 
coni rmed the laity’s subordinate status in the administration of 
Christian justice.
The Council of Basel’s rejection of the laity’s right to discipline 
the clergy was only one aspect of its restrictive attitude towards lay 
involvement in the Church. It was implied that the detestable moral 
standards of the laity disqualii ed them from correctly discussing 
matters of the faith in public.23 The council also pointed out that 
the vernacularization of scripture was directly responsible for the 
proliferation of errors and heresies, since misguided readers could 
only grasp the husk of the words and not arrive at the root of their 
20. James A. Brundage, “Prostitution in the Medieval Canon Law”, Signs, 1 
(1976), p. 825-845, esp. p. 830. Ruth M. Karras, “The Regulation of Brothels in 
Late Medieval England”, Signs, 14 (1989), p. 399-433.
21. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 96 a. 2 and IIaIIae, q. 10 a. 11.
22. Sacrorum Conciliorum, vol.  29, p.  875. “Nam per ipsum non turbatur 
politia; nec plebium multitudinem lusibus, deliiciis et voluptatibus deditam facile 
est abstinere”.
23. Concilium Basiliense, vol.  8, p.  79: “modernis, prochdolor, diebus 
quamplures laici, quos eciam de recta i de eorum detestabiles vita et mores parum 
commendant, de i de et eius articulis… publice et assuete disputant…”
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meaning.24 In a similar fashion, Jean Gerson argued that access 
to the vernacular scriptures encouraged erroneous interpretation, 
because the immediate, literal meaning of the biblical texts needed 
to be inserted within a matrix of scholarly interpretation in order 
to assume its true signii cance.25 Good character was identii ed as 
the bedrock of reliable scriptural interpretation.26 The exposition 
of biblical passages required men of outstanding intelligence, who 
were well-intentioned, humble in judgement, and immune from 
vice. In Gerson’s view, doctors were to be ranked in accordance 
with their conformity to these attributes.27 Implicit here was the 
accusation that the heretics (and the lay estate in general) were 
not sufi ciently endowed with clerical values to undertake the task 
of scriptural interpretation. These assumptions were also present 
in the work of Pierre d’Ailly. Preaching on the text from Luke 
21, 25, “There will be signs in the sun, the moon and the stars”, 
d’Ailly glossed the stars as references to the qualities required by 
the conciliar delegates. Even though no Catholic persons should 
be excluded from the assembly, the base and the ignorant were not 
specii cally to be summoned. Instead, the conciliar representatives 
should excel in the three attributes of nobility: in their sublime 
eminence, in the clarity of their radiant wisdom and in the power 
of their inl uence. These conditions were most suitably fuli lled by 
those in charge of the administration of the Church: i.e. the clergy 
24. Concilium Basiliense, vol. 8, p. 126: “solum enim corticem verborum et 
non radicem racionum sapiunt”. See also Concilium Basiliense, vol. 8, p. 108.
25. Jean Gerson, De necessaria communione laicorum sub utraque specie, 
Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Palémon  Glorieux, vol.  10, Paris, Desclée, 1960-
1974, p. 57-58: “Scriptura Sacra dum per novellos homines inducitur tamquam 
credenda sit in suis nudis terminis absque alterius interpretis vel expositoris 
admissione, exponitur gravibus periculis et scandalis… ex hac praetera radice 
pestifera orti sunt et quotidie crescunt errores Begardorum et Pauperum de 
Lugduno, et omnium similium, quorum multi sunt laici habentes in suo vulgari 
translationem Bibliae”.
26. The idea that reliable scriptural interpretation rested upon moral 
foundations can be found in Augustine. See Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: 
Meditation, Self-Knowledge and the Ethics of Interpretation, Cambridge Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 174-242, esp. 198-199 and 228-232.
27. Jean Gerson, De necessaria communione laicorum, p.  57: “Comparandi 
sunt igitur doctores in expositione Sacrae Scripturae cum doctoribus, et illi quos 
constat habere conditiones positas in praecedenti regula [i.e. the one laying down 
the moral requirements for correct biblical exposition], praeferendi sunt non 
habentibus”.
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(ecclesiastici).28 The same assumption of clerical superiority can be 
detected from a different perspective. When the opponents of the 
Council of Basel, such as Juan de Torquemada, wished to strike it 
a telling blow, they alleged that tavern keepers, domestic servants 
and other ignorant people were present in the assembly and held the 
same voting rights as the bishops and cardinals.29
These assertions of clerical pre-eminence in doctrinal matters 
can be linked to the broader struggle of medieval clerks to 
distinguish themselves from the unlearned. The disparagement 
which the university-trained élite heaped upon the uneducated 
has been illuminated by Alexander Murray.30 Klaus Schreiner has 
pointed out that medieval intellectuals, Gratian prominent among 
them, drew a sharp distinction between two types of Christian (duo 
genera Christianorum): the clerical estate with its competence 
over sacramental and theological functions, and the laity with its 
duties concerning earthly affairs, procreation, and the protection of 
the Church. This dichotomy had repercussions for the intellectual 
involvement of the laity in matters of faith, for they were often 
stigmatised as incapable of playing an equal role with clerics in the 
discussion of theology.31 The distinction was, of course, challenged 
in a university milieu, where philosophers championed their own 
secular version of the life of contemplation, replete with its own 
code of sexual morality. Alain de Libera has noted that Étienne 
Tempier’s list of prohibited theses in 1277 sought, among other 
things, to besmirch the ideal of philosophical nobility with the 
stigma of sexual promiscuity in order that the theologians might 
recover the ideological monopoly of the celibate.32 Perhaps the 
28. Pierre d’Ailly, Oratio… de ofi cio imperatoris, papae, reliquorumque 
membrorum Concilii Constantiensis, Joannis Gersonii… Opera Omnia, vol.  2, 
ed. Ellies Du Pin, Antwerp, 1706, p. 921.
29. Sacrorum Conciliorum… Collectio, vol. 31, p. 65-66; p. 109. J. Helmrath, 
Basler Konzil, p.  83-84. These criticisms were repeated by others, such as 
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Johannes de Palomar and Pietro del Monte. See also 
J. Miethke, “Konzilien als Forum der öffentlichen Meinung”, p. 750.
30. Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle Ages [1978], 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 237-244.
31. Klaus Schreiner, “Laienfrömmigkeit – Frömmigkeit von Eliten oder Fröm-
mig keit des Volkes?”, Laienfrömmigkeit im späten Mittelalter, ed. Klaus Schreiner 
and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1992, p. 1-78, esp. p. 13-26.
32. Alain de Libera, Penser au Moyen Âge, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p. 236. On the 
attempts of philosophers to raise themselves to a “quasi-priestly supremacy”, see 
also A. Murray, Reason and Society, p. 265-270.
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accusation that the laity were innately sexual corrupt was used 
in a similar fashion by Gerson and Charlier. They were arguably 
widening the battlei eld to encompass those outside the university 
walls who had challenged the clerical monopoly on learning, and 
the moral status that sustained it.
THEORIES CONCERNING LAY PARTICIPATION AT THE COUNCILS
The deep suspicions towards lay inl uence in the Church—salient 
in the councils’ anti-heretical activities—can also be detected in the 
comments of the conciliarists about lay participation in the general 
councils. These theories have been thoroughly examined by a 
number of historians, so I will not analyse them here in great depth. 
They will instead provide a starting-point in a discussion about the 
ideological tensions which undercut the arguments that the laity 
should be entirely excluded from doctrinal debate.
The conciliar commentators who addressed the question of lay 
involvement, started from the premise that it was most appropriate 
for prelates and lesser clerics to attend the general councils. The 
scope for lay participation was nevertheless wider than may i rst 
appear. Gerson wrote that the council was a congregation drawn 
from every rank of the Catholic Church, and that no person who 
needed to be heard should be excluded.33 However, he made the 
distinction (which was accepted in practice at both Constance 
and Basel) between a consultative and a decisive voice. Only the 
latter had any force in the creation of conciliar decrees. In matters 
pertaining to the faith, the laity could cast no vote. In his proposals 
for universal participation, Gerson had in mind the exploitation of 
the particular competences of each rank in the Church hierarchy. 
If, for example, questions were raised about the repair of church 
buildings, stone-cutters and masons would be invited to the councils 
for their advice, and questions of philosophy and moral philosophy 
could be elucidated by lay people learned in these disciplines.34 
33. J. Gerson, De Potestate Ecclesiastica, Œuvres Complètes, vol. 6, p. 240: 
“Concilium generale est congregatio… facta ad aliquem locum ex omni statu 
hierarchico totius Ecclesiae catholicae, nulla i deli persona quae audiri requirat 
exclusa”.
34. J.  Gerson, De Potestate Ecclesiastica, p.  241: “Si quaeratur de modo 
reparationis ecclesiarum materialium, esse potuerit in latomis vox consultiva; sic in 
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Gerson’s vision of the Church emphasised the compartmentalisation 
of practical and intellectual skills in a hierarchy of social functions. 
It should be noted, all the same, that he made large allowances for 
lay participation in the councils. Indeed, his proposals were far 
more inclusive than the regulations actually adopted at the councils, 
where lay representatives were almost exclusively the proctors of 
princes.
A similar open-mindedness towards lay participation is 
illustrated by the inl uential canonist Niccolò Tudeschi.35 He was 
far less restrictive on this matter than his immediate predecessors. 
Of these, the famous fourteenth-century canonist Giovanni 
d’Andrea had set the tone.36 The Glossa Ordinaria of the Liber 
Extra put forward three occasions in which laypeople could be 
present at a general council. First, they could be invited to a council; 
second, they could be present when causes of the faith were being 
discussed; third, they could take part in the conciliar regulation 
of marriage, for when certain matters concerned them, they could 
be present.37 Giovanni d’Andrea strictly qualii ed the scope for 
attendance in these scenarios: laypeople were to be present to hear 
what was discussed. They were not to judge or teach on these 
matters. In fact, it was not even strictly necessary for the lay to 
be present at councils at all, because conciliar decisions could be 
made known to them by preaching. Sometimes they could attend 
in order to petition for justice, but when the councils handled 
clerical business or saw to the correction of priests, all laypeople 
had to be excluded.
Tudeschi, on the other hand, revealed more fully the ambiguity 
of the canonistic tradition on this matter, and clearly articulated 
his own disagreement with d’Andrea. First, he noticed that when 
matters of the faith had been discussed at the councils, laypeople 
aurifabris et fabris; sic dum i t quaestio de philosophicis et moralibus disciplinis… 
possunt saeculares eruditi in philosophiae legibus et moribus dare consilium”.
35. For a detailed assessment of Tudeschi’s theories regarding lay 
participation, see Knut W. Nörr, Kirche und Konzil bei Nicolaus de Tudeschis, 
Cologne, Böhlau, 1964, 159-165.
36. It is, for example, repeated without demur by Francesco Zabarella in his 
commentary at x 3.10.10. All references are to Francisci Zabarellae super primo 
(-5) Decretalium libro… Commentaria, Florence, Thierry, 1602.
37. Glossa Ordinaria at x 3.10.10 ad v. Contingere, Decretales Gregorii IX… 
suis comentariis illustratae, Paris, G. Merlin, 1561, col. 1198-1199.
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had occasionally intervened uninvited.38 On one hand, it was not 
necessary for laypeople to be called, because the power to decide 
matters of the faith had been given pre-eminently to clerics. Clerics, 
in effect, exercised power on the behalf of laypeople. Revealingly, 
Tudeschi cited anti-heretical laws, which prohibited laypeople from 
publicly or privately disputing the faith.39 Like other conciliarists, 
he was aware of the dangers of allowing lay people to discuss 
theological questions indiscriminately. However, if laypeople 
spontaneously presented themselves to the councils when the 
faith was being discussed, they were to be admitted. Tudeschi 
acknowledged that after the crucii xion of Christ, the faith had 
survived in only one lay woman: the Virgin Mary. The laity’s claim 
to protect the faith could not, therefore, be dismissed entirely. In 
those cases where they presented themselves of their own accord, 
they were not coni ned to listening to the council’s deliberations (as 
d’Andrea had claimed), but could give their advice and speak their 
mind.40
These assertions have been cited to demonstrate the open-
mindedness of the conciliarists towards lay participation.41 The 
fact remains, however, that the theoretical allowances were not 
fully acted upon. At neither Constance nor Basel was there a 
sizeable lay party which availed itself of the opportunity to discuss 
matters of faith. Jürgen Miethke has shown that the councils were 
dominated by the clergy, with university graduates, in particular, 
overrepresented.42 The “democratizing” process at Basel was 
38. N.  Tudeschi, Concilia et Questiones, Turin, 1577, n°  27, fol.  129r: “In 
causis autem i dei dicit quod laici intervenerunt etiam non vocati”. See Glossa 
Ordinaria at D.  63  c.  2 ad v.  Invitatur, Corpus Iuris Canonici… cum glossis 
diversorum, Paris, Nicolas Jullerion, 1618, col. 314.
39. For example, vi 5.2.2 in Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 2, ed. E. Friedberg, 
Lepzig, B. Tauchnitz, 1879, p. 1069-1070.
40. N.  Tudeschi, Concilia et Questiones, fol.  129r: “sed si laici sponte se 
offerunt ad concilium in causa i dei: tunc puto quod debent admitti et sic proprie 
loquitur illud capitulum, ubinam [D. 96 c. 4] ibi enim imperator obtulit se. Et sic 
intelligo gloss. in c. adrianus. [D. 63 c. 2] cum enim i des potest remanere apud 
simplicem laicum ut dixi in aliis dubiis: quia non potest ecclesia esse nulla, interest 
cuiuslibet si vult interesse, ut admittatur et tunc puto quod non simpliciter audient, 
ut dicit Io. An. sed consulent et dicent opiniones eorum”.
41. Francis Oakley, The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the 
Catholic Church 1300-1870, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.  73, 
note 39.
42. J. Miethke, “Konzilien als Forum der öffentlichen Meinung”, p. 751-753.
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reserved for the clergy, and after 1436 the incorporation of lay 
members in the council was almost entirely brought to an end. At 
most, laypeople accounted for less than one percent of the total 
number of incorporated representatives at any one time at Basel. 
Most of these were the ambassadors of secular rulers, and it is 
highly unlikely that there were any stone-masons among them.43 It 
is to this gulf between theory and practice that we must now turn.
POPULAR INFLUENCE IN ECCLESIASTICAL ELECTIONS: 
THE CANONISTIC THEORY
The i ght against heresy hardened conciliar attitudes towards lay 
participation in the Church. Yet it did not generate any radically 
new ideas: its effect was instead to deepen pre-existing prejudices. 
The gap between theory and practice at the general councils was 
indicative of a broader ambivalence towards lay participation in 
ecclesiastical administration. It goes without saying that popular 
participation in the Church took many forms, and it is impossible 
to treat them all here. To narrow down this enormous i eld, I will 
concentrate upon ecclesiastical elections.44 This subject has been 
chosen because the laws concerning elections were of crucial 
importance in shaping the procedures of the councils themselves. 
In treating canonical elections, the canonists broached problems of 
representation and of trustworthiness, which pertained equally to 
conciliar decision-making. At i rst glance, lay participation in these 
processes would seem to be entirely ruled out by the later canon 
law. Yet under closer scrutiny, a more elaborate picture emerges.
The discussion must begin with the problems involved in 
identifying what is meant by the term populus in the sources. 
The word “people” is often used vaguely by historians, and even 
lawyers of the i fteenth century struggled to dei ne populus exactly. 
By examining their dei nitions we can detect some of the legal 
commentators’ assumptions about popular authority. The people 
assumed different guises in the pages of the canonists. On the 
one hand, they are envisioned as the mob, whose participation in 
43. J. Helmrath, Basler Konzil, p. 84-85.
44. A masterful treatment of the subject can be found in R.H. Helmholz, The 
Spirit of the Classical Canon Law, Athens, University of Georgia Press, p. 33-60.
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decision-making is unwelcome and generally injurious. On the 
other, they are seen as a bulwark of the Church, whose humble 
assent is to be invoked by the clergy. These kinds of tensions can 
also be detected in élite attitudes towards lay devotion: Gerson 
felt it necessary to curb devotional practices which were out of 
keeping with ofi cial theology while at the same time sustaining 
the popular engagement with the faith. He admitted that the Church 
hierarchy occasionally had to make concessions to local practices, 
such as innovations in the worship of saints.45 The ambiguity of the 
lay-clerical divide was embedded in the use of the term populus. 
Francesco Zabarella concluded that in general, the terms populus 
and clericus were distinct. When the people were described in 
odious terms, then the clergy were not to be understood as included 
in their ranks. However in favourable cases the name “people” 
could include clerics.46 Even though they intended to reinforce 
the elevation of the clerical estate, the canonists could not help 
admitting that the clergy could at times be considered a part of the 
Christian people.
Indeed clericus was almost as vague a term as populus. Strictly 
speaking, it embraced the priesthood, but in was often applied to 
scholars or even literate people who had not been ordained. Very 
few of the authors examined in this paper were careful to dei ne what 
they meant by clericus. My sense is that the canonists generally 
used the word to denote priests. In the case of the general councils, 
the references become murkier, and the apologists of the councils 
had good reason to conl ate the two meanings of clericus. When a 
large number of university graduates were effectively taking control 
of the machinery of curial government (especially at Basel), it was 
very useful to blur the lines between university scholars and the 
priesthood. This kind of ambiguity could only strengthen the claims 
of the university-trained to represent the Church and to wield its 
jurisdictional and doctrinal powers.
45. See Daniel B. Hobbins, “Gerson on Lay Devotion”, A Companion to Jean 
Gerson, ed. Brian P. McGuire, Leiden, Brill, 2006, p. 41-78. See Gerson’s letter of 
1412 to the Carthusians at Basel in Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 2, p. 151-152.
46. Zabarella ad Clem.  1.3.6: “In favorabilibus nomen populi comprehendit 
clerum”. Edition consulted: Francisci Zabarellae… in Clementinarum volumen 
Commentaria, ed. P. Franchi, Venice, 1602. The clergy could also be included in 
the case of a general interdict on the populus: see Zabarella’s gloss ad x 4.1.11.
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After this brief excursus, I wish to return to the canonists’ theories 
on ecclesiastical elections, and the caveats which complicated 
the apparently clear-cut theory that the laity were to be excluded 
from these procedures. The locus classicus for the clericalist view 
was the decretal Massana (x, 1.6.56), which declared bluntly that 
if any laypeople were involved in the election of a prelate, the 
election would be void.47 This law was reinforced by the decretal 
Osius episcopus (x, 1.6.2), which dealt with an episcopal election 
in which the people were accused of interference. The Glossa 
Ordinaria drew the conclusion that no bishop was to be elected by 
popular acclamation, since the people were presumed to be acting 
in the hope of some kind of gain.48 The gloss cited a saying from 
the Decretum: “the people are not to be followed, but taught,” and 
one from the Codex: “the false voices of the people are not to be 
heeded.”49
These cases seem to bear an obvious afi nity to the disputed 
election of Pope Urban VI in 1387 (probably the most notorious 
clerical election of the fourteenth century). A few words should 
be said about this before I move on. Calling Urban’s election into 
dispute, the dissenting cardinals claimed that the Roman crowd 
that had wished to see a Roman, or at least an Italian, elected to 
the papal throne, had threatened them with violence if they did 
not comply with their wishes. Such intimidation, the cardinals 
argued, had invalidated the election.50 The Camerary, Pierre de 
Cros, justii ed the cardinals’ actions by declaring that Urban VI had 
occupied the papacy through the sedition and violent commotion of 
the people.51 This claim was to prove controversial, however. The 
47. The rubric at x 1.6.56  states: “Non valet electio pontii cis per laicos et 
canonicos facta, et si hoc habeat consuetudo, hoc dicit et quotidie solet allegari”. 
See Decretales Gregorii IX, p. 226.
48. Gloss ad x.1.6.2, ad v.  Populi: “Nota quod ad clamorem populi nullus 
est eligendus: quia spe aut gratia hoc faciunt, aut pretium inde recipiunt”. See 
Decretales Gregorii IX, p. 121.
49. D.  62  c.  2 in Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. Émil L. Richter and Émil 
Friedberg, Leipzig, B.  Tauchnitz, 1879-1881, vol.  1, p.  234: “Docendus est 
populus, non sequendus”. Cod. 9.47.12 in Corpus Iuris Civilis, ed. Paul Krueger, 
Berlin, Weidmann, 1954, vol. 2, p. 391: “Vanae voces populi non sunt audiendae”.
50. Howard Kaminsky, Simon de Cramaud and the Great Schism, New 
Brunswick N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1983, p. 20-25; Walter Ullmann, The 
Origins of the Great Schism, London, Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1948, p. 69-89.
51. Daniel Williman, “The Camerary and the Schism”, in Genèse et Débuts 
du Grand Schisme d’Occident, Paris, Éditions du Centre national de la recherche 
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lawyers who leapt to Pope Urban’s defence, among them Baldus 
de Ubaldis and Giovanni da Legnano, replied that the actions of 
the crowd could not be deemed to constitute true interference, in 
the sense of robbing the cardinal electors of their free will. Baldus 
argued that the cardinals’ arguments would only hold true if they 
had been physically constrained by the crowd to give their consent. 
Of this, however, Baldus could see no evidence.52 The arguments 
of Baldus and Legnano constituted a useful case for overlooking 
popular interference in canonical elections. It is striking that their 
claims are not mentioned in the texts of Zabarella and Tudeschi 
that will be analysed below, in spite of the fact that the latter 
canonists were almost certainly aware of the earlier jurists’ opinions 
(indeed Zabarella had been a pupil of both Baldus and Giovanni 
da Legnano).53 The reasons are not far to seek. For one thing, the 
arguments of Baldus and Legnano ran against the grain of the canon 
law, which sought, on the whole, to stigmatize popular participation 
in clerical elections. Furthermore, the status of Urban’s election 
continued to be disputed up until the Council Constance put an 
end to the Schism. Those of the Avignonese obedience refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of Urban and his successors until the 
bitter end. It would have been imprudent for Zabarella and Tudeschi 
to have introduced the extremely contentious example of Urban 
VI’s election into commentaries which aimed to elicit the widest 
support among educated legal opinion.
Zabarella and Tudeschi passed over the claim that popular 
pressure was irrelevant to the outcome of a clerical election, so long 
as the electors retained their free will. Instead they chose to dwell 
on the inappropriate aspects of popular participation in canonical 
elections. It is noteworthy that Zabarella used classical authors 
scientii que, 1980, p.  70: “Bartholomeus de Prinhano… sacrum papatum 
Romanum… per seditionem et popularem tumultum ac impressionem violenter 
occupaverit”.
52. For Baldus’s case, see Caesar Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici, vol. 26, ed. 
Augustin Theiner, Bar-le-Duc, 1864-1883, p. 580-599, esp. p. 592-593. Legnano 
made use of the equally Hobbesian argument that even though the cardinals had not 
wished to elect an Italian, they had chosen Urban willingly in order to avoid death 
at the hands of the mob: Annales Ecclesiastici, vol. 26, p. 608. On Legnano, see 
Alexandra Gooden, “Papal authority and canon law in the fourteenth century: the 
writings of John of Legnano”, Unpublished Oxford University DPhil dissertation, 
2005. On the Urbanist legal case, see W. Ullmann, Origins, p. 143-169.
53. W. Ullmann, Origins, p. 145.
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and passages from the civil law (identii ed by some historians 
as the sources par excellence of medieval and early modern 
republicanism) to undermine the standing of the people in the 
decision-making process. Zabarella quoted Cicero’s acerbic aside 
on Varus’s seizure of the African government, where he questioned 
whether imperium was an appropriate term for something “which 
was offered to a private party by the agitation of the ignorant rabble, 
with no public consultation”.54 Zabarella also cited Roman laws 
which declared that slaves manumitted through popular compulsion 
were not, in fact, free.55 He was quick to link popular participation 
in ecclesiastical affairs with the mob rule deplored by his ancient 
authorities. The reference to manumission is particularly revealing, 
as there is no explicit indication in Osius episcopus that the electors 
had been intimidated by the crowds. Indeed, Tudeschi considered 
the possibility that the wrongfully elected bishop had adduced the 
approval of the people as a means of having his election coni rmed 
by a superior.56
The distrust of the people continued to be evoked in the canonists’ 
discussion of rules regarding the presumption of innocence and 
guilt. The words of Osius episcopus clearly accused the people of 
lacking good faith. Tudeschi declared that the wishes of the people 
as a whole were less reliable than the intentions of its more prudent 
members. There were many base persons among the people, who 
did not have correct judgement stemming from reason, and were 
therefore corruptible. Although certain laws stated that an accused 
individual should be presumed innocent, this presumption was 
not to be applied to all the individuals who constituted the people 
as a collective group.57 An interesting comparison can be drawn 
between this conclusion and the assurance of the conciliarists that 
54. F.  Zabarella ad x 1.6.2. Cicero, Pro Ligario, 3: “si illud imperium esse 
potuit, quod ad privatum clamore multitudinis imperitae, nullo publico consilio 
deferebatur”. See Cicero, Pro T. Annio Milone… ed. and trans. Nevile H. Watts, 
Cambridge, Mass., Loeb, 1931, p. 460-461.
55. Dig. 40.9.17. Cod. 7.11.3. See Corpus iuris civilis, vol. 1, p. 682-683 and 
vol. 2, p. 299.
56. N.  Tudeschi ad x 1.6.2 in Commentaria… in Primum Decretalium 
Librum, Venice, 1592, fol. 105v: “Petebat iste coni rmationem a superiore et de 
electione sua faciebat i dem ostendendo literas populi qui eum elegit”.
57. N. Tudeschi ad x 1.6.2 in Commentaria, fol. 105r: “quilibet in singulari 
praesumitur bonus, ut in… [X 2.23.14]… et tamen in populo collecto non est ista 
praesumptio respectu singulorum, ut hic”.
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the Church as a whole was blessed with unerring faith. This passage 
may be connected with the argument that lay people were more 
effectively represented by priests at the general councils than they 
would have been in person. As Johannes Helmrath has shown, the 
lay voice was understood to be subsumed within the clergy’s at the 
Council of Basel.58
Despite their depreciation of the people’s integrity and their 
intellectual capacity, the canonists were practical men and they 
realised that the Church authorities could not turn an utterly blind 
eye to the wishes of the people. Another example from the Roman 
law was cited by Zabarella on the matter of popular interference in 
elections. The law from the Digest assigned the death penalty to 
those convicted of assassination. The death sentence was usually 
to be delivered only in consultation with the prince, but in some 
cases it might be safer for a judge to act immediately without 
consultation, if the mob could not be appeased in any other way.59 
In an ecclesiastical context, Zabarella cited various situations in 
which the wishes of the people needed to be heeded: a man, barred 
from taking holy orders, might be admitted to the priesthood if this 
prevented dissension from tearing the community apart.60 Similarly, 
a bishop might resign his position, if his relationship with his l ock 
was so acrimonious that it led to scandal.61
In the examples above, the wishes of the people are tolerated 
in order to preserve harmony within the community. Yet Tudeschi 
admitted that popular participation could be treated constructively 
and not simply as a nuisance which the Church was constrained 
to accept. Commenting on a decretal which mentioned the 
summoning of religious men (religiosi) to a collegiate election (the 
implication being that the men were not members of the college), 
Tudeschi cited various laws from the Decretum which adopted 
a more accommodating stance towards popular participation in 
58. J. Helmrath, Basler Konzil, p. 90. This idea was prominent in the thought 
of Nicholas of Cusa. See Erich Meuthen, “Nikolaus von Kues und der Laie in der 
Kirche”, Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft, 81 (1962), p. 105.
59. F. Zabarella ad x 1.6.2. See Dig. 48.8.16 in Corpus iuris civilis, vol.  1, 
p. 853.
60. D. 50 c. 25 in Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. É. Friedberg, vol. 1, p. 187.
61. Glossa ordinaria ad x 1.9.10 ad v. Pro gravi: “Pro scandalo licitum est 
episcopo petere licentiam cedendi, cum aliter scandalum sedari non potest”. See 
Decretales Gregorii IX, col. 257.
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ecclesiastical elections. One, a letter from Pope Gelasius, required 
two bishops to assemble all the laypeople (universam turbam) of a 
particular town in order to resolve a contested election.62 Tudeschi 
concluded that in these cases the people had not been called to take 
part in the election but to give their consent to the decision made by 
the electors.63 This interpretation harmonised with the prescriptions 
regarding lay participation in the councils. In both cases it was 
expected that the people would play a largely passive role in the 
decision-making process. Yet the situation became more complex 
when Tudeschi considered a case in which the people decided to 
withhold their consent. Should the election made by the college be 
declared void? Tudeschi decided that it should not, if the people 
had contradicted the outcome with no good reason. It might be 
ruled otherwise, however, if a scandal were caused by ignoring the 
popular will.64 A gloss of the Decretum cited by Tudeschi went 
far further and stated that if a bishop had been elected without the 
consent of the people, then his consecration ought to be annulled, 
for the consent of the people was always required.65 Tudeschi cited 
two other laws which coni rmed that legitimate canonical elections, 
which had selected the best candidate for the job, were to be declared 
void if a scandal to the people arose.66
It is immediately apparent that Tudeschi and Zabarella were 
not in the business of supplying one-dimensional answers to 
the questions raised in their commentaries. The twists and turns 
of their arguments should give us pause for consideration. It is 
puzzling that the later canonists did not seek to simplify the law, 
62. D. 63 c. 11 in Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. É. Friedberg, vol. 1, p. 238.
63. N.  Tudeschi ad X 1.6.1 in Commentaria, fol.  104v: “Populus autem 
vocatur non ad eligendum, sed ad consentiendum electioni”. Tudeschi cites 
D. 63 c. 27 in support.
64. N.  Tudeschi ad x 1.6.1 in Commentaria, fol.  104v: “Sed adverte: pone 
quod populus non vult consentire electo per collegium, nunquid debet irritari 
electio? vide gl.  not.  62 di.  c.  1.  q.  dicit, quod non, ex quo non habet causam 
rationabilem contradicendi, nisi scandalum generetur”.
65. Glossa ordinaria, ad D. 62 c. 1 ad v. Nec a plebibus: “Sed quod si aliquis 
est consecratus, qui non habuit consensum plebis, numquid cassabitur consecratio? 
Videtur quod sic, in odium consecrantium et eligentium, cum contemptus est… 
nam semper consensus plebis est requirendus.” See Corpus Iuris Canonici, 
col. 312.
66. Glossa ordinaria, ad x 3.5.6 ad v.  Si non potest: “Propter scandalum 
quandoque receditur a iure”. Decretales Gregorii IX, col. 1120. See the gloss to x 
1.9.10 cited above.
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separating out the chaotic accretion of conl icting judgements and 
providing a gloss which most nearly accorded with contemporary 
realities. They certainly had the theoretical tools with which to 
perform such an operation. It was recognised that changes in 
custom could invalidate old laws. Such principles of historical 
change were applied in theology, where they served to refute the 
demands of the heretics to return to the practices of the ecclesia 
primitiva. Nicholas of Cusa, writing to the Bohemians, declared 
that the rites of the sacraments had been variously performed 
over time, just as the scriptures had been variously adapted and 
understood. Christ had arranged that the mystery of the faith 
should hold true in a variety of circumstances. According to Cusa, 
the Hussites were not wrong in arguing that the Eucharist had 
been offered to the laity in both kinds in the primitive Church, 
but they were mistaken in believing that such an arrangement 
had been intended to be universally and eternally valid.67 
Kantik Ghosh has shown that William Woodford used a similar 
historicising strategy in response to Wyclif’s monologic brand of 
scriptural interpretation.68 These forms of multivalent scriptural 
hermeneutics had the aim, however, of reinforcing a single set of 
doctrines sanctioned by authority. If the scriptures were open to 
many readings, then an extra-scriptural adjudication of conl icting 
interpretations was required. The dialogic method of the canonistic 
commentaries had different results. It revealed the tensions within 
the legal tradition, often without decisively rejecting one or 
another of the available interpretations. Although they aimed to 
iron out the discrepancies of the law, the canonists often let them 
stand. Tudeschi could well see that decretals, such as Massana, 
which anathematized lay participation in elections, manifestly 
contradicted older determinations about the necessity of popular 
consent. There was no recognition in his glosses, however, that 
this conl ict diminished the authority of the earlier law.
67. Nicholas of Cusa, Opera, Basel, 1565, p.  833: “diversis temporibus 
alius et alius ritus sacrii ciorum et etiam sacramentorum stante veritate invenitur, 
scripturasque esse ad tempus adaptatas et varie intellectas… Christus enim… 
mysteria pro temporum varietate dispensat”. On Nicholas’s historical method, see 
W. Krämer, Konsens, p. 259-264.
68. Kantik Ghosh, The Wyclifi te Heresy: Authority and the Interpretation of 
Texts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 67-85.
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Purely intellectual reasons can be adduced for the canonistic 
method.69 The canonistic commentaries need to be related to modes 
of scholastic enquiry in other disciplines. Perhaps the dialectical 
methods of the canonists can be seen as a refuge for the scholastic 
method, at a time when they were coming under threat in many 
universities. At Oxford in the years after Wyclif’s death, for 
example, many scholars took up the evangelical doctor’s distrust 
of vain theological speculation and the uncertainties implicit in 
reconciling discordant traditions.70 Of course, it was far from the 
intentions of the later canonists to replicate the philosophizing of 
the twelfth and thirteenth-century schools. But the enterprise of 
harmonising the entire corpus of the law necessitated its own forms 
of dialectical procedure, at a time when theologians were more 
insistently brandishing monologic interpretations of scriptural and 
patristic texts in their battles with the heretics.
The changes in ecclesiastical administration in the later Middle 
Ages also help to explain the canonists’ grudging admissions 
concerning the acknowledgment of the popular will. As a large 
body of research has shown, the quotidian regulation of parish life 
could not have proceeded without the cooperation of the clergy 
and trustworthy lay members of local communities. In an English 
context, Ian Forrest has shown how lay support was enlisted by 
the clergy in the battle against Lollardy. The detection of heresy 
was dependent upon communal discernment and activism, and 
the secular government and the Church made extensive use of a 
system of public communication in order to mobilise popular 
involvement.71 But, needless to say, lay participation in the life of 
69. A classic interpretation of the canonistic method may be found in Stephan 
G.  Kuttner, “Harmony from Dissonance: An Interpretation of Medieval Canon 
Law”, The History of Ideas and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages, 
ed. S. G. Kuttner, London, Variorum, 1980, p. 1-16. Brian Tierney identii es the 
Decretum as “a running argument”. See B. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar 
Theory, p. 25. What is lacking in both these accounts is an attempt to relate the 
canonistic method to other academic disciplines. On this subject, see Olga Weijers, 
Queritur utrum. Recherches sur la “disputatio” dans les universités médiévales, 
Turnhout, Brepols (“Studia artistarum”, 20), 2009.
70. Jeremy I.  Catto, “Theology after Wyclifi sm”, The History of the 
University of Oxford, vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford, ed. Jeremy I. Catto and Ralph 
Evans, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 264-265.
71. Ian Forrest, The Detection of Heresy in Late Medieval England, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005.
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the Church went far beyond the prosecution of heresy (and indeed 
far beyond anything mentioned so far in this paper), as prominent 
members of parish communities were entrusted with the handling 
of parish i nances, the repair of the fabric of churches, and the 
arraignment and prosecution of public sinners before the Church 
courts, to name only a few examples.72 This participation was not 
accurately rel ected in the canon law,73 but it is reasonable to assume 
that the canonists were aware of the practical arrangements made by 
the laity and the clergy at a local level, and recognised that in those 
rare cases where a local community was in persistent and damaging 
conl ict with their priest or bishop, the cleric might be forced to 
stand down. This was to recognise a kind of negative election in 
ecclesiastical appointments – a popular veto in all but name.
THE AMBIGUOUS PLACE OF THE PEOPLE IN ECCLESIASTICAL ELECTIONS
The conl icted theoretical description of the lay-clerical divide in 
the late medieval canon law was rel ected in practice. In closing my 
discussion of the theories regarding lay participation in the Church, 
I would like to consider two examples of clerical elections in which 
popular involvement was mentioned. It goes without saying that the 
inferences drawn from these cases are not necessarily universally 
applicable. Nevertheless, within the frame of this paper, they are 
sufi cient to suggest that ambiguities in the realm of theory were 
equally present in the practicalities of Church government.
It should, of course, be noted that many of the higher ofi ces 
in the Church were no longer i lled by canonical election in the 
i fteenth century. Bishops were increasingly chosen by papal 
reservation or the appointment of secular rulers.74 It appears to be 
72. There were, of course, analogous forms of cooperation between local 
communities and central government within the realm of secular politics. See 
John  L.  Watts, “The Pressure of the Public on Later Medieval Politics”, The 
Fifteenth Century IV: Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain, ed. Linda Clark 
and Christine Carpenter, Woodbridge, Boydell, 2004, p. 159-180.
73. Paul  Ourliac, “L’Église et les laïques à la i n du Moyen Âge: étude de 
droit canonique”, Études d’Histoire du Droit Médiéval, ed. P. Ourliac, Paris, A. et 
J. Picard, 1979, p. 607-620.
74. For changes in the laws and procedures governing episcopal elections in 
England, see R.H. Helmholz, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume 
1, Oxford, OUP, 2004, p. 491-4.
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the case, however, that in i fteenth-century France, after a period of 
abeyance, the rights of the cathedral chapter in episcopal elections 
were reasserted. Véronique Julerot has illustrated a remarkable 
competition between several rival candidates for the bishopric of 
Paris in 1492.75 She has revealed that some of these candidates 
used public processions and the posting of placards around the 
town as a means of enlisting popular support for their candidature, 
and for discrediting the candidature of others. Julerot i nds in this 
election a striking demonstration of the quest for popular consent 
in the legitimisation of clerical elections. It is notable that in 
the subsequent judicial enquiry into the election, the canonical 
candidates themselves made attestations of the popular support that 
they had received. This remarkable solicitation of lay involvement 
demonstrates, at the very least, the recognition that the approval 
of the townspeople in Paris would be a useful asset to the future 
bishop.
In an English example, the ambiguities of clerical attitudes are 
more fully revealed. The case concerns a contested election to 
the deanery of Hereford in 1462. The election of a certain John 
ap Richard was originally reported to the bishop of Hereford, John 
Stanbury, as a model of canonical procedure. It is noteworthy that 
the letter of the chapter to the bishop, informing him of its decision, 
stressed the level of popular involvement in the election. A copious 
multitude was said to be present at the mass preceding the election. 
The letter was careful to stipulate, however, that the people had 
left the chapterhouse before the election itself had taken place.76 
The chapter’s scrupulous observance of canonical procedure was 
also rel ected in its declaration that all absent canons were to be 
declared contumacious, in accordance with the constitution of the 
general council, Quia Propter, which was read out and shown to 
the canons by Richard Rudhale.77 The choice of Rudhale was surely 
75. Véronique Julerot, “‘Peuple’ chrétien et élection épiscopale à la i n du 
xve siècle”, Revue d’Histoire de l’Église de France, 91 (2005), pp. 27-49.
76. Diocesis Herefordensis: Registrum R. Beauchamp… Registrum J. 
Standbury, ed. Arthur T. Bannister, London, Canterbury and York Society, 1919, 
p. 74: “omnibusque aliis tam clericis quam laicis in multitudine copiosa ibidem 
existentibus postea a dicta domo recedentibus et exclusis, convenientibusque tunc 
in ipsa domo capitulari omnibus canonicis subscriptis”.
77. Diocesis Herefordensis, p. 76: “quibus sic peractis et constitucione concilii 
generalis, Quia propter, per magistrum Richardum Rudhale, archidiaconum 
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not accidental, for he possessed a doctorate in canon law from 
the University of Padua, one of the most prominent law schools 
in Europe. Once the canons had reached consensus through a 
compromise solution, they were careful to publicise their decision 
in the vernacular to the assembled people, in accordance with 
the strictures of Quia propter about the avoidance of clandestine 
elections.78 The bishop himself evidently saw no apparent 
dei ciencies in the election, because he coni rmed it on 26 June 
1462.
The chapter was not, however, as unii ed as it had pretended in 
its original letter, nor was the signii cance of the lay involvement 
uncontested. An appeal against the election of John ap Richard 
was launched, perhaps by those canons who had been absent at the 
election, perhaps by those involved in the dissensions preceding the 
compromise solution. Here the popular participation in the election 
was described in a very different manner from the original letter. 
The dissenting canons alleged that John Bayly would have been 
elected dean, had he not been hindered by the pressure of lay power, 
summoned by Richard Rudhale. It was only as a result of this lay 
obstruction that John ap Richard had been elected.79 It is now difi cult 
to determine whether laypeople had really intimidated the electors, 
or whether certain factious canons had simply used this allegation 
as a pretext to force an episcopal annulment of the original election. 
What surfaces from the case, at all events, is the manifestation 
of the canonistic ambivalence towards popular involvement in a 
practical context. The multitude is portrayed in the original letter 
as a legitimate, passive but at the same time approbatory element 
in the election, which we have seen in the conciliar discussions of 
lay participation at the councils. In the letter of contestation, we 
are in the presence of the detestable mob described by Zabarella 
antedictum, coram nobis ibidem ad tunc distincte et aperte perlecta et exposita”. 
Quia propter was incorporated into the Liber extra at x 1.6.42.
78. Diocesis Herefordensis, p.  77: “nostram eleccionem et eius formam… 
clero et populo in magna multitudine ibidem congregatis mandavimus et fecimus 
in vulgari publicari”.
79. Diocesis Herefordensis, p. 81: “Johannes Bayly, vice sua et vice omnium 
canonicorum… in decanum eligisset, ni per impressionem potencie laicalis per 
dictum Ricardum Rudhale invocate horribiliter impeditus fuisset, et isto modo 
et non alio prefatus dominus ap Richarde per potenciam laicalem, ut premittitur, 
ductus fuerat ad summum altare…”
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in his commentary on Osius episcopus. Bishop Stanbury himself 
decided to interpret the intervention of laypeople with suspicion 
(perhaps favouring the maxim: dubia in deteriorem partem), for he 
invalidated the election of John ap Richard and annexed to himself 
the right of appointment to the deanery.
Both the Paris and Hereford election cases demonstrate that, in 
spite of the restrictions of the later canon law, popular approbation 
was sometimes considered a useful asset to canons competing for 
higher ofi ce. The Hereford election dispute shows the difi culties 
attendant on the use of popular participation as a tool of afi rmation: 
it was open to contestation by those who viewed canonical elections 
as an exclusively clerical decision-making process. Nevertheless, 
the examples serve to remind us that the high clerical theory which 
disdained lay involvement in ecclesiastical decision-making was 
neither universally accepted nor immutably translated into practice. 
In parts of the Holy Roman Empire, in particular, it seems that lay 
parties had much greater inl uence over clerical elections than in the 
two cases mentioned here.80
CONCLUSION
At this point, we should return to consider the validity of Ullmann’s 
critique of the councils. His comments certainly draw attention to 
signii cant omissions in the councils’ reforming ideology. These 
need to be seen, however, not only in terms of an instinctive fear 
of the people, but as part of an extremely complex system of lay-
clerical interactions. I have only been able to analyse one dimension 
of these relationships in this paper, but I hope nevertheless that my 
approach towards the councils has addressed some of the limitations 
of Ullmann’s vision. I would argue that conciliar attitudes towards 
lay inl uence in the Church cannot be characterised purely as the 
result of unconscious oversight or prejudice, but as an unstable 
ideological compound, constantly tested by the countervailing 
80. Dietrich Kurze, “Hoch- und spätmittelalterliche Wahlen im Nieder-
kirchenbereich als Ausdruck von Rechten, Rechtsansprüchen und als Wege zur 
Konl iktlösung”, Wahlen und Wählen in Mittelalter, Reinhard Schneider and 
Harald Zimmermann, Sigmaringen, Thorbecke, 1990, p. 197-225.
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pressures of an anti-heretical campaign and of the practicalities of 
ecclesiastical government.
The other problem with Ullmann’s argument is that it is 
predicated upon a teleological reading of the period, where the 
democratizing forces of the Reformation sweep away the rotten 
hierarchical structures of the old Church. This reading is highly 
inaccurate. It is widely acknowledged among Reformation scholars 
that the i ery words of Luther and Zwingli about Christian liberty 
in 1520 quickly turned to fear and anger at popular extremism.81 
Indeed, if there was a blurring of the lay-clerical divide among 
Protestants, there was also a concomitant accentuation of the 
divisions between those who possessed an education in the 
ancient languages and those who did not.82 Philipp Melanchthon 
stressed, for example, that the scriptures could only be adequately 
interpreted by those who had been thoroughly trained in the arts of 
grammar, logic and rhetoric83. This was designed quite explicitly 
to exclude the bulk of Christians from the theological debates 
superintended by the leaders of the Protestant churches.84 In the 
Roman Catholic Church, too, the aims and assumptions of Trent 
were very close to those of the i fteenth-century councils. Even 
if the mood of activism was accentuated, it was still envisaged 
that the Church would be reformed primarily through the 
education of the clergy and the improvement of pastoral care. It 
was assumed that the laity would follow the clergy’s lead.85 The 
81. Robert W.  Scribner, The German Reformation, London, Macmillan, 
1986, p. 45; John S. Oyer, Lutheran Reformers against Anabaptists, The Hague, 
M. Nijhoff, 1964.
82. It has been noted that in Protestant churches, “possession of suitable 
learning set the minister apart… from the rest of humanity”. Euan Cameron, The 
European Reformation, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 393.
83. Timothy J.  Wengert, Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness: Philip 
Melanchton’s Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 99-100.
84. For the view of German reformers towards learning and scriptural inter-
pretation, see Erika Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation 
Germany, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.  39-48; R.  W.  Scribner, 
German Reformation, p. 50.
85. John W. O’Malley, Trent and all that: Renaming Catholicism in the Early 
Modern Era, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 131. Hubert 
Jedin replies to the criticism that Trent neglected laypeople by pointing out that 
this was outside the council’s brief, i.e. to clarify the teachings of the Church. See 
H. Jedin, Crisis and the Closure of the Council of Trent: a retrospective view from 
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i fteenth-century councils were not, therefore, the last gasp of an 
ideologically bankrupt Church. The ideological tensions that we 
have witnessed in this paper were part of a far longer process of 
negotiation and contestation over the value of lay involvement in 
ecclesiastical politics and matters of the faith.
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